I have serious doubts about whether a world without nuclear weapons would be a universally good thing. But whether or not "Global Zero" is a desirable goal, I don't think it's really possible. I can't see many of the nine current nuclear powers being ready to dismantle their weapons in the near or intermediate future.
Here's why.
United States: President Obama has declared his intention to work towards a world with no nuclear weapons. But for the United States, nuclear disarmament would carry prohibitive political costs. A still-strong public sense of American exceptionalism would kill any disarmament plans, especially unilateral disarmament.
Russia: Russia continues to adjust to budget constraints that are the result of the country's dependence on oil exports. Lower oil prices and a lack of other income are making themselves felt in Russian defense spending. Russia will be forced to compensate for its deteriorating and increasingly underfunded conventional military with a more powerful nuclear deterrent, similar to Eisenhower's "New Look." Russia's attachment to nuclear weapons will almost certainly tighten before it loosens.
China: In contrast to Russia, China's military is improving rapidly. The PRC wants to regain its position from centuries ago as the primary power in East Asia. As long as the United States maintains its strong presence in the region, China will feel the need for a nuclear deterrent to put itself on equal footing with the US as the changing global balance of power searches for a new equilibrium. More locally, increasing tensions with fellow nuclear power India will also make China unwilling to disarm.
India & Pakistan: At first glance, these two countries might appear to be good candidates for disarmament, since the two sides' nuclear arsenals seem mainly pointed at each other. But this ignores China's influence on South Asia. India's rivalry with China continues to drive India to expand its nuclear capabilities. Pakistan, assisted by China, is trying to keep pace with India . In addition, cross-border terrorism between India and Pakistan keeps tensions between the two countries high. As a result, disentangling the relationship of nuclear motivations on the subcontinent will necessarily include a consideration of China, making it a much more complex proposition.
Britain & France: The nuclear arsenals of Britain and France are to some extent redundant. The United States' nuclear capabilities in Europe could provide an adequate nuclear umbrella for NATO without the assistance of these two countries. However, Russia's power and proximity to Western Europe continue to make British and French leaders value an independent nuclear arsenal. Additionally, as in the US, disarmament would be politically difficult. Nuclear weapons are perceived as essential to preserving British and French influence and stature on the world stage.
North Korea: The DPRK's nuclear arsenal is vital to the survival of the current regime. The threat these weapons provide is the only real tool the government has to preserve North Korea's isolation from the world. As long as Kim Jong-Il and those who think like he does are in power there, North Korea would sooner use its nukes than lose them.
Israel: Surrounded on three sides by a culture and group of states that resent its very existence, Israel probably could not be convinced to give up its (as yet undeclared) nuclear weapons without several decades of peaceful coexistence with its neighbors, including a resolution of the Palestinian question and verification that no other states in the Middle East possessed or were seeking nuclear weapons or indeed any WMDs. Even then, Israel would be very, very reluctant to disarm.
In addition to thse case-specific factors, the idea of Global Zero has no inherent permanence. My fellow I-Streeter Patrick is fond of applying a Pandora's Box metaphor here: nuclear weapons exist. Even if they were all dismantled, many people around the world would have the knowledge necessary to build a new nuke. Even without these people, the world would still know that nuclear weapons were possible, and any state that felt the need for a trump card in the international system would still seek to obtain them. The current nuclear powers know this, and would be loath to surrender national and potentially global security to the hope that an international organization could successfully sniff out and stop clandestine nuclear programs.
It seems nearly impossible that global nuclear disarmament will be achieved within the 20-year time frame proposed by Global Zero. The United States, Russia, and China form the lynchpin of the disarmament debate Without cooperation between these three, disarmament is dead, and it doesn't look like all three will be on the same page on this issue for some time. Right now, we need to focus on non-proliferation. We need to focus on helping nuclear states keep track of their weapons, to keep them away from non-state actors. Above all, we need to be inclusive. To some degree, each of the nuclear powers views its arsenal as a symbol of national sovereignty and prestige. Talk of total disarmament will scare some of them away from the negotiating table. Building a framework for dealing with the risks of loose nukes and proliferation is an achieveable goal, and an urgent one. We shouldn't allow ourselves to fail at this goal simply because we were too attached to the lofty ideal of Global Zero. For the next decade or two, at least, we should do the best that we can to maintain Global Nine.
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