It is a commonplace that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are a massive drain upon the political, military, and financial resources of the United States. Although civilian leaders like to put deadlines for the achievement of objectives and troop withdrawals, “victory” is proving difficult to define and achieve. I do not doubt that a stable liberal democracy could eventually be established in Afghanistan, given enough time and effort on the part of the US military. However, in light of the tremendous financial, political, and military cost of a protracted war as well as the minimal strategic significance of Afghanistan, the best choice is to disengage.
Currently, the US has about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. At about 1 million dollars per soldier per year, that will cost the US well over 100 billion dollars per year. More importantly, our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other factors, preclude involvement in other countries like Iran and North Korea (see "Contain Iran" by James Robinson). These many woes of warfare will not go away in the near future; it will take years before Afghanistan has been molded into a stable democracy.
The strategic importance of Afghanistan, as well as the entire Middle East, is greatly overstated (see “The Middle of Nowhere” by Edward N. Luttwak). Afghanistan has few natural resources and no significance in the international network of trade. It is a nation of impoverished farmers who live in isolated hamlets. What do we hope to gain from Afghanistan? Proponents of the war will argue that the Taliban in Afghanistan poses a national-security threat to the US a la September 11, 2001. This argument is unpersuasive. No doubt, the existence of the Taliban is counter to our interests. However, we must consider the costs and benefits of pursuing the Taliban to every last cave and mountain. I believe that disengagement is preferable to our current strategy when we consider our costs and benefits.
Disengagement is not withdrawal. I advocate neither a sudden or gradual withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Rather, I propose that the most economical and effective use of our forces is to stop all major combat operations and fortify our ground forces into bases near urban centers. There they can protect the central government from large foreign and domestic threats which materialize, and they can thwart the machinations of the Taliban through extensive aerial bombardment (see “In Praise of Aerial Bombardment” by Edward N. Luttwak). This will minimize the material and human costs while maintaining a degree of stability acceptable to our interests.
This choice is certainly unpalatable for policy-makers. The increase in civilian casualties will be unpopular, not to mention the perception that we have “given up” the fight against terror or the hunt for Osama. However, considering the minimal strategic significance of the region and the tremendous resources and time required by our current strategy, disengagement is the best choice. True, it will surrender the Afghan people to instability and violence for the foreseeable future, but it will serve our own interests and enable us to deal with unforeseen problems which may emerge. After all, as Polybius says, “In war we must always leave room for strokes of fortune, and accidents that cannot be foreseen.”
