Greetings everyone! I have just joined this "blog" and am eager to contribute my thoughts and comments. Althought I am no expert on foreign policy, nor even an international affairs student, I believe that my studies of antiquity and history may be of interest and possibly - dare I say it - relevant to issues in the modern world. I am currently completing a research paper which analyzes the role of limitanei and soldier-civilian interactions in Roman Arabia. However, for my first blog, I would like to write a brief summary and review of a book I read this summer (or last spring? I forget when I finished it).
The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Ancient Greece is a book by the historian Victor Davis Hanson which gives helpful insights into the uniquely Greek approach to warfare and how that approach still colors our perspective on waging war.
The conditions of an egalitarian and agrarian Greek society helped mold hoplite battle and thus western warfare. Farmer-soldiers needed to be present in their fields and preferred to be home with their families, so they opted for short, brutal, and decisive battles as opposed to extended campaigns of attrition. Hoplite battle is perfectly suited for these all-or-nothing battles. Two armies face off in an open field and clash in a head-to-head collision of shock infantry. Hanson goes into extensive detail regarding the sheer horror of this kind of battle. Although war only consisted of a few hours of combat a year for a Greek polis, it had a profound impact upon the psyche of the hoplite. Hanson argues that the glorification of war found in literature is merely a symptom of how tremendously the prospect of open battle weighed upon Greek men.
The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Ancient Greece is a book by the historian Victor Davis Hanson which gives helpful insights into the uniquely Greek approach to warfare and how that approach still colors our perspective on waging war.
The conditions of an egalitarian and agrarian Greek society helped mold hoplite battle and thus western warfare. Farmer-soldiers needed to be present in their fields and preferred to be home with their families, so they opted for short, brutal, and decisive battles as opposed to extended campaigns of attrition. Hoplite battle is perfectly suited for these all-or-nothing battles. Two armies face off in an open field and clash in a head-to-head collision of shock infantry. Hanson goes into extensive detail regarding the sheer horror of this kind of battle. Although war only consisted of a few hours of combat a year for a Greek polis, it had a profound impact upon the psyche of the hoplite. Hanson argues that the glorification of war found in literature is merely a symptom of how tremendously the prospect of open battle weighed upon Greek men.
Because of the conditions of Greek warfare, battle was limited in scope, a few hours a year. While we have inherited the Greek preference for open and decisive battles, we have greatly expanded the scope, lethality, and consequences of war in the modern world. A hoplite might have fought a few hours a year, but a marine in Afghanistan has to deal with the prospect of conflict for months at a time. Gone are the days when soldier-civilians, after voting in the assembly, would take up shield and spear and fight out a war to defend their endangered lands. Now, with our professional armies and modern arsenals, cold and calculating decisions are made, and long drawn out campaigns are fought, sometimes with devastating consequences.
While Greek infantry battle was just as brutal as modern warfare, if not more so, we can learn from their perspective. For them, battle was a brutal necessity and a communal choice. Rather than seeking out the total domination of their enemies, as Alexander the Great would later do, Greek armies in the 5th and 6th centuries fought chiefly to resolve conflict through quick and decisive battle. Our problem is that we share the Greek desire for decisive and head-on battle but have greatly expanded the scope and aims of warfare. Now, we fight enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq who do not fight the "Western Way of War." This presents us with a quandary which talented strategists have tried to fix through various forms of "counter-insurgency." As we seek to serve the interests of the state through warfare, we should remember the material and human cost brought on by the modern way of war.
Correct me if I'm wrong Jwar (or if you had made this point in your posting as I skimmed it :)) but I think that you also brought up an interesting point yesterday about how this greek warfare was so much more deadly and effective than the Persian (???) warfare model. I think you said that this is why western warfare is also so much more deadly? I was just wondering if you could explain this point a little as I was finding it so interesting!!!
ReplyDeleteThanks Elke! I apologize in advance for my long reply.
ReplyDeleteThat's an interesting point that you bring up which addresses a debate which I only touched upon tangentially in my post. It is apparent to any observer of history that, for one reason or another, "the west" has generally dominated everyone else in nearly every way. You may be familiar with Jared Diamond's book, Guns, Germs, and Steel. In it, he argued that the supremacy of European civilizations can be traced to biological, environmental, and geographical factors. Basically, the west is the best because biology and geology predetermined her to be so.
Hanson offers a different view in a book which I am currently reading, Carnage and Culture. In it, he argues that culture, not predetermined factors of geography, made the west what it is today and allowed it to dominate other peoples of the world. Hanson looks at major battles between western armies and other forces and examines the underlying cultural factors which explain western victory. For instance, freedom to speak and associate helped the Greeks win at Salamis, the desire for frontal assault and decisive victory helped Alexander win at Gaugemala, and civic militarism helped the Romans continue to fight even after the disaster at Cannae. I haven't yet reached the later portions of the book that look at medieval, early-modern, and modern battles, but similar factors account for western victory in those struggles. Unlike Diamond, Hanson sees culture as the driving force behind history and western dominance.